

BIOTERRORISM WATCH

Preparing for and responding to biological, chemical and nuclear disasters

Traumatized health care providers may need stress counseling in horrific aftermath of bioterror attack

A severe test for a mentally tough profession

In a finding that is likely relevant to many other states, a recent tabletop exercise in Columbus, OH, found that the health care system may be better prepared to deal with bioterrorism victims than the traumatized frontline providers who give them care.

The exercise was conducted by the Ohio Senior Interagency Coordinating Group in Columbus.

After running a scenario involving intentional release of pneumonic plague at a rock concert, emergency preparedness officials discovered there was little in place to address the mental health needs of doctors and nurses in the horrific aftermath. In the exercise, an attack with *Yersinia pestis* resulted in 332 fatalities, 720 hospitalizations, and 4,300 people who were examined and released.

“How do you handle all of the nurses and doctors who have seen many, many deaths, who have tried to decrease panic by remaining calm, and who have survived this huge confusion and turmoil?” asks **Kay Ball**, RN, MSA, CNOR, FAAN, a participant in the exercise and perioperative consultant and educator at K & D Medical in Lewis Center, OH. “What about their mental health? That is something that we found that we are weak in. We really have to develop that better.”

The hypothetical event began Friday, March 15, when a popular regional band performed at Shawnee State University in Portsmouth, OH. Approximately 2,000 students and community members went to see the band, which is known for its use of smoke and visual enhancements,

according to the scenario. **(See tabletop timeline, p. 3.)**

“[The terrorists] aerosolized the agent in a fogging system and that is how it was spread throughout the building,” says **Darren Price**, exercise training officer with the state of Ohio Emergency Management Agency in Columbus.

The players take their seats

The exercise had four groups of about nine people, each working at different tables as the events unfolded. The groups were health/medical, law enforcement, fire/emergency medical services, and government. An audience of about 150 people was on hand to observe and evaluate the exercise.

“The whole purpose was to determine our strengths and weaknesses through the disaster that happened,” says Ball, who served as facilitator and discussion leader of the health/medical group. “The planning committee will meet and analyze what we learned from this, and then we will bring back everybody who participated.”

The scenario was divided into three phases: incubation, response, and recovery. Each phase received about an hour of discussion at the tables, and all players received updated information at the same time. **(See tabletop tips, p. 2.)** The scenario was necessarily arbitrary but designed to

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test the state's resources at many levels, Price notes.

"Anytime, you are dealing with tabletop exercises there are a lot of assumptions and artificialities built in just to make it flow," he says. "We ask [participants] to bring their emergency operations procedures and plans, and to actually react based upon their plan."

While the exercise is still being analyzed, the mental health needs for medical providers became apparent in playing out the scenario. Part of the problem is the historic perception that health care workers must not succumb to the emotional toll of patient care, Ball says.

"Even in surgery today, if we lose a patient on the table, there is nothing really in place to talk about the trauma the practitioners are going through," she says. "We just think that we are these stalwart people and we can't crumble under emotional strains. That was one of the [identified] weaknesses."

In contrast, firefighters and emergency medical service workers had a more thorough stress debriefing process than their hospital-based counterparts.

"Within the hospitals themselves we really don't have the mental and spiritual health that we need," she says.

Moreover, the scenario projected widespread "psychological manifestations" in the affected area, with students withdrawing from school and residents reluctant to return to their homes. Bioterrorism response planners brainstormed about how to fight the problem, including bringing in celebrities and public officials to show it was safe to return to the stricken area.

The scenario included a short delay in determining the etiological agent, with chaos building before plague was confirmed as the infecting pathogen. Even with the new emphasis on bioterror education, that scenario is fairly realistic because so few clinicians have seen infections caused by the potential bioterrorism pathogens.

"The first problem was what kind of a bug was it?" Ball says. "Where do we send the cultures, and how fast can we get them back?"

The scenario also had many students leaving on spring break. Given the anticipated exodus of people from the community — particularly into the neighboring states of Kentucky and West Virginia — there was no attempt to set up mass quarantine areas, Price says. Instead the national stockpile of antibiotics was called up and confirmed or suspect cases were treated and isolated.

"We looked at the issue of quarantine and determined it was not really feasible," he says. "You would have these large [quarantine] circles everywhere. We moved more toward isolation [of patients] at that point."

While identifying a weakness in mental health care, the planners found communications were strong between groups, there were no turf battles, and additional resources became available quickly.

"One of the strengths that we found was that we were able to get supplies in and to call in extra people," Ball says. "We were able to pull in lots of people very rapidly. We are learning how to work more with all of the other diverse factions."

Indeed, the exercise was set in a rural area so that resources would be taxed, reaching thresholds that would trigger state response, Price adds.

"We're better prepared today than we were yesterday," he says. ■

Bioterror tips for running a tabletop

Planners of a recent bioterrorism tabletop exercise in Columbus, OH, (**see cover story for more information**) offered the following tips for participants in the exercise:

- The scenario is plausible, and events occur as they are presented.
- There are no hidden agendas or trick questions.
- All players receive information at the same time.
- There is not a "textbook" solution. Varying viewpoints and possible disagreements are anticipated.
- Respond based on your knowledge or current plans and capabilities.
- Current agency or department policies and procedures should not limit discussion and development of key decisions.
- The outcome is neither intended to set precedents or reflect an organization's final position on specific issues.
- Assume cooperation and support from other responders and agencies.
- Speak up! Talk to your colleagues and ask questions. This is your chance to learn how other agencies in your community would respond in an emergency. ■

Dire straits: Plague released at concert

Tabletop scenario from first case to aftermath

Highlights of a recent bioterrorism tabletop exercise run by planners in Ohio (**see cover story for more information**) included the following timeline of events:

Sunday, March 17, 2002, Portsmouth, OH

8:00 a.m.: At the emergency department (ED) of Southern Ohio Medical Center (SOMC), a doctor has just come on duty and sees her first patient, a 22-year-old woman. The patient's sister says the woman has been complaining of chest pain and has a temperature of 102 degrees F. The sister worries that the patient may have caught the "bug" through her position at the Shawnee State University (SSU) dormitory mailroom where she works part time. A rapid flu test shows a negative result.

The physician is suspicious in light of the national anthrax cases five months earlier and orders a sputum and blood culture. Transport assistance is requested for sending the cultures to the Ohio Department of Health (ODH) laboratory for anthrax testing. The woman is admitted. The Portsmouth City Health Department and Scioto County District Board of Health are notified of the situation. In turn, the ODH and Ohio Emergency Management Agency (EMA) duty officer are called.

2:00 p.m.: The 22-year-old woman admitted to SOMC earlier this morning develops severe respiratory complications and dies. A full autopsy is ordered, and the physician awaits the preliminary results of the sputum and blood cultures. As the day progresses, local emergency medical services (EMS) become overwhelmed with patients presenting with flu-like symptoms. People presenting with the most severe symptoms, including high fever and difficulty breathing, are hospitalized; however, with many more sick waiting in the ED, the hospital beds and wards are filling rapidly.

5:00 p.m.: Traffic around SOMC becomes impassible, and several ambulances are severely hindered. Medical facilities request security assistance from local law enforcement agencies.

10:00 p.m.: Six patients admitted during the day with the severe flu-like symptoms also die. New cases continue to arrive at SOMC with an increase in the number of patients reporting each hour.

Monday, March 18

8:00 a.m.: Overnight, a public health emergency was declared in Scioto County. A request was made

by Scioto County Health, via the Scioto County EMA and elected officials for state support in the growing crisis.

A Level 2 emergency status is reached in Scioto County. The state assessment room is activated to support the events in Scioto County.

10:00 a.m.: The preliminary tests of clinical specimens taken from the 22-year-old woman who died Sunday are complete. The ODH Lab notifies the local health departments that the specimens have tested negative for *Bacillus anthracis*. The laboratory begins rule-out testing for other pathogens.

3:00 p.m.: Epidemiological evidence points to an event three days earlier as a common activity of the majority of new patients. On Friday, March 15, a popular regional band performed at SSU in Portsmouth. The band is well known for use of visual enhancements. Approximately 2,000 students and community members attended the concert.

4:00 p.m.: Hospital supplies are insufficient to meet demand. Fifteen additional patients have died, and 111 are listed in critical condition. Reports now include similar symptoms among several health care workers and first responders. SOMC hospital beds are full.

5:30 p.m.: ODH Lab staff notifies Scioto County local health officials that the 22-year-old patient's cultures are preliminarily positive for *Yersinia pestis*. Local health officials inform local health care professionals and EMS personnel that, in order to prevent the spread of disease, patients having confirmed pneumonic plague should be isolated until sputum cultures are negative for *Y. pestis* bacilli.

Those suspected of having pneumonic plague should be isolated for 48 hours after antibiotic treatment begins.

Wednesday, March 27

It has been 10 days since the first victims arrived at SOMC and local clinics. There have been no further cases of illness identified in Scioto County in the past seven days.

Waiting for signs of recovery

Resources begin to flow into the area as a result of national public outreach. Visitors, however, avoid the area and the impact of the event on the local economy becomes apparent as local businesses are slow to reopen.

The psychological manifestations associated with this event are widespread. Although school reopens, many students withdraw from classes for the quarter. Local residents, still frightened and shocked, look to local and state officials for guidance as they attempt to return to normalcy. ■

Winds of war: Researchers track airborne anthrax

A strikingly rapid and wide dispersion

Struck by the surprising level of aerosolization after merely opening an envelope, Canadian researchers are now using a spore surrogate to study how airborne anthrax silently spreads within an office building, *Bioterrorism Watch* has learned.

Researchers are using *Bacillus globigii* spores to simulate the movements of *Bacillus anthracis* in a one-story research building at the Defence Research Establishment Suffield (DRES) at the Canadian Forces Base in Suffield, Alberta, says **Kent Harding**, chief scientist at DRES. “We will be looking at movement between actual offices along corridors using the *B. globigii* as a simulant. It is a spore-like material that is a well-accepted simulant used to assess and challenge biological detection apparatus.” The DRES is on the cutting edge of bioterrorism research; scientists there were studying the dispersion of anthrax from envelopes prior to Sept. 11 and its aftermath. In response to an anthrax hoax mailing in Canada in February 2001, the DRES conducted a study last year using an 1,800 cubic foot test chamber to represent an office space. “We had a hoax letter in this country that closed down a major federal office building,” he says. “We were interested in [determining] had it been a real infectious material in the envelope, what was the extent of the risk? We went to the scientific literature and really didn’t find anything.”

It was hypothesized that opening an envelope constituted a “passive form of dissemination” that would produce minimum aerosolization of spores unless additional energy was added via panic behavior or strong airflows, the researchers stated.¹

“Our scenario was in a chamber, which was conducive to studying the movement of materials on air currents,” Harding says. “An individual was given a stack of envelopes and told to keep opening them until powder fell out. When that happened, [he or she] stood quietly by the desk and didn’t move for 10 minutes. We just looked at the movement of material around the room, just simply as a consequence of opening the envelope and pulling out a piece of standard 8½ by 11 paper folded in three.” Almost immediately upon opening the envelope, a significant aerosol concentration was observed in the area of the “desk.” It

declined slowly over the 10-minute sampling period, but the high-resolution slit sampler plates used to measure the release became densely packed with bacterial colonies. In the study, significant numbers of respirable aerosol particles were released upon opening envelopes containing 0.1 g or 1.0 g of *B. globigii* spores. A potentially deadly dose could be inhaled within seconds of opening an anthrax spore-filled envelope. Also, the aerosol quickly spread throughout the room so that other workers, depending on their exact locations and the directional airflow within the office, would likely inhale doses. There was very heavy contamination on the back and front of clothing worn by the test subject.

“There was a large dose presented to the person opening the envelope, which was not unexpected,” Harding says. “But what was surprising was the very rapid and extensive movement around that room simply as consequence of the movement of normal air currents. It distributed around the room very quickly and in fairly high quantity.”

The researchers also found that the spores could escape from a sealed envelope, a phenomenon that caught U.S. investigators off-guard during the 2001 attacks. “We did note that in a standard envelope sealed in the usual way — just with licking the glue on the back of — that there are substantial openings on the back of the envelope,” he says. “In fact, the ‘envelope people’ design them that way so you can get a letter opener inside. Spores did escape from those openings, but we never quantified that and never referred to it to anything more than an anecdotal manner.”

The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) in Atlanta was apparently unaware of the study during the initial stages of the U.S. anthrax attacks. Whether it would have made any difference is impossible to say, though some wonder if it would have resulted in more aggressive treatment of postal workers.² Regardless, the CDC decision to administer antibiotics to a broad range of people, not just those in the immediate exposure area, is reinforced by the study, Hawkins says. The Canadian researchers have now fully briefed the CDC about the study and their ongoing research.

References

1. Defence Research Establishment Suffield. Kournikakis B, Armour SJ, Boulet CA, et al. Risk assessment of anthrax threat letters. September 2001. *Technical Report DRES TR-2001-048*.
2. Brown D. Agency with most need didn’t get anthrax data. *Washington Post*, Feb. 11, 2002:A/03. ■